(moved here for jaimiato's sake).
Hello, everybody. I think this is the most important question that's been raised:
Woodruff wrote:SultanOfSurreal wrote:the soldiers were not watching in blurry black and white through a gunsight, they were watching in broad daylight with their own fucking eyes, and they should have been able to tell that there was no threat. and even allowing that they made an honest mistake, firing on van rescuing the wounded was a violation of rules of engagement and qualifies as a war crime of the worst kind. jesus christ you are stupid.
Do you know what the rules of engagement were at this point? I certainly don't, and I'd like to. I certainly haven't seen them listed anywhere.
I'd like y'all to read this in its entirety because it's extremely informative and really clears this issue up. Understanding this key question unlocks a more profound understanding of this video's situation and many other situations that one sees on a common enough basis.
If you don't read it, then you're not going to learn anything new.
So from a Feb 19, 2008 interview with Lt. Col. David Bolganio and several experts on law and other military servicemen, PBS.org provides some insightful information:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haditha/themes/roe.htmlFirst, we have the gunner and pilot assessing a situation. They see guns and an RPG man, who ducks behind the wall. That constitutes as an imminent threat, and they decide to engage in self-defense. So, as they roll up and gun them down, that's completely legal and comlpetely reasonable.
According to Lt. Col. David Bolgiano, U.S. Air Force:
The confusion over the inherent right of self-defense doesn't come from the written word. It doesn't come from the law. …
The confusion over the inherent right of self-defense comes from assessing judgment-based shootings after the fact that, in the clear vision of 20/20 hindsight, may not appear to be reasonable when, in fact, by law and by tactics, they were. Let me give a prime example (see that website's 3rd answer).
In short, that example being the one about a car speeding towards a US military checkpoint in Iraq and failing to slow down. The soldiers perceive this as a threat and shoot it to hell. After the fact, it could've been an Iraqi bringing his pregnant wife to the hospital or an Italian intelligence officer driving a freed reporter back to safety. At the time of the shooting, those soldiers made a reasonable and justifiable decision.
Now, there's also this:
[What is positive identification?]
… Positive identification is a targeting term that's used against a declared hostile. For instance, we'll take a notional rules of engagement … where our command authority at a high level will designate terrorist group ABC as a designated hostile.
To engage that person, all one needs to do is ascertain positive ID -- in other words, to reasonably believe that that particular person is a member of the ABC terrorist group. We're unconcerned about whether or not that person is presenting an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. It matters little under the law or tactics.
However:
PID is nearly always irrelevant when it comes to responding to an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury in a self-defense capacity. I don't care whether or not the person shooting at me is a member of ABC terrorist group. I don't care if, in fact, they're an insurgent. All I care about is, by their actions, are they presenting an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to myself or friendly forces? That's all the legal authority I need to engage them. So too oftentimes this PID term is incorrectly sprinkled into what is, in fact, a self-defense scenario.
And so Gary Solis, an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown Law School; Marine (Ret.) says this on PID:
Can you explain positive identification? …
PID, positive identification, is as the term implies: Before you can fire on an individual, you must positively identify that individual as representing a threat to you or your fellow Marines or soldiers. And if you cannot do that, then you are not supposed to fire on him or her.
So he contradicts what the Lt. Col. says, but let's hear him out:
The question is always, what constitutes PID? Some of us may have seen the shooting of a wounded individual in a mosque in Fallujah that happened some time ago. When one observes that, you may initially say, "Well, there's no PID there. There's no threat evident there. That looks like a murder in combat."
And the question is not what I think or some other viewer thinks. The question is, what was in the mind of the Marine who shot the individual? Did he honestly and reasonably believe that that individual presented a threat to him and/or his fellow Marines? And, if he did, then no offense has been committed.
So it's not only an objective assessment, but then it's also a largely subjective assessment. … That's why one person may say yes; another person may say no. The question is, what did the shooter feel? …
So from the US soldiers' point of view they did the right thing. Even with the van, it can be argued that he still did the right thing. His buddies were approaching that area, he had no idea what was in the van, even if they're putting a wounded "fighter" in it, he's not sure what's in there, but he's not going to take the chance to wait and find out if the enemy will try crashing that van into his buddies on the ground and exploding them to bits.
Gary Myers, Attorney for Lance Cpl. Justin Sharratt, says:
[… Over the course of this war our tactics have changed. Our understanding of the strategy has changed. How have these rules of engagement changed as well?]
Well, frequently they're local rules of engagement that address a given set of circumstances. Fallujah II is an example of where the rules of engagement were dramatically relaxed to allow for Marines to fire much more liberally, shall we say, than they would be in other environments. But Fallujah II is considered by the Marine Corps, and by those who were associated with it, to be one of the most significant battles in the history of the Marine Corps. And so the rules of engagement there were relaxed.
Rules of engagement are promulgated on the local level and so there are many rules of engagement that adjust to individual circumstances. So it's impossible to tell you there hasn't been a generic shift in the rules of engagement. The fundamentals are still the same -- right to self-defense, positive ID, so on. But there are, under certain circumstances, alterations in the rules of engagement to take into account the anticipated operational circumstance.
So this shows that these rules can be more flexible at times. However, Gen. James Conway of the US Marines brings up an interesting point to the interviewer's question:
[Can you talk about the insurgent tactic of hiding behind civilians? We've heard elsewhere that it's actually a tactic for the insurgents to actually bait U.S. forces into firing on civilians. Why would they do that? How would they do that?]
.....Let me give you an example. Before we crossed the berm in Kuwait in '03, we had an expression that we used to help our commanders understand application of the rules of engagement. We said if we initiate fire, the issue is collateral damage; if the enemy initiates fire against you, the issue is proportionality, OK, so that if you take a single sniper round from a building, if you can identify the window that that fire came from, then you can put fire on that window, certainly.
That you would destroy the entire building with a 500-pound bomb does not meet this concern for proportionality, and it's not something we would encourage our troops to do. So that's, again, the nature of an insurgency. If this were open warfare and we knew those buildings were cleared, the village was empty, we wouldn't hesitate. But where there are civilians, we must exercise those concerns. ...
The helicopter gunner didn't drop bomps on these guys, he used the right amount of firepower to deal with the perceived threat. So, even though there were reporters among these perceived insurgents, they're still fair game since the perceived insurgents were using them as shields.
When those "insurgents" identification becomes clear at aa later time, this still has no bearing on the legality of the decisions made by the soliders right before they engaged them.
The main reason why the Pentagon wanted to cover this up is because the public would react wildly while not really understanding the sensible reasoning on part of the US soldiers (much like what has been seen here in this thread and I'm sure in many parts of the world).
Let's give Gen. James Conway the final word:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haditha/interviews/conway.html[I understand you can't talk in specifics about rules of engagement on the ground. But can you talk generally about how the rules of engagement are different in an insurgency than from other conventional conflicts?]
The rules of engagement are not terribly different. The rules of engagement that we put into place as we crossed the berm going into Iraq in '03 are exactly the same rules of engagement that are in place today.
At its essence, what the rules of engagement say are that if you feel threatened by an enemy force or by an incident that's taking place in front of you, you are authorized to engage. That hasn't changed, nor should it change, be it a conventional environment or an insurgent environment. ...
Thanks for reading, hope this clears everything up.